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Ann Blair, for "The Languages of the Sciences and the Languages of the Humanities" 
  Disciplinary distinctions before the "Two Cultures" 
 
    C.P. Snow's notion of "two cultures" as separate and in tension with one another grew out 
of his particular experiences--notably as a fellow at a Cambridge College starting in 1930, as a 
novelist, and as a senior official in various positions in the English government through the mid-
1960s. But the expression Snow coined in his 1959 Rede lecture resonated rapidly beyond his 
immediate milieux and continues to circulate in academic and common parlance among English-
speakers, especially in the British Isles and the United States, even as the grounds for conceiving 
tensions between the "two cultures" have changed.
1 Despite its broad resonance today and its 
potential usefulness for analyzing current and past interactions between the disciplines, especially 
starting in the 19th century, the distinction between the "two cultures" does not apply universally 
across space or time. Snow's lecture was translated into a number of European languages within a 
decade, but the expression has not become widespread in languages other than English.
2 Indeed 
there are often no exact equivalents in other languages for the “sciences” and the “humanities” as 
Snow used the terms.
3 Even within the modern West different political, educational and cultural 
circumstances have spawned different emphases within and interactions between the disciplines. 
  The culturally contingent nature of our Anglo-American notion of "two cultures" is made 
more evident by looking back to pre- and early modern European contexts, when neither the 
"sciences" nor the "humanities" were extant as categories. Even without the categories that seem to 
channel our interactions today, in those presumably “simpler,” less specialized times disciplinary 
distinctions fostered tensions too, but along different faultlines. In presenting briefly two examples 
of the dynamics between the disciplines in medieval and early modern Europe I argue that 
distinctions between the disciplines bring with them crucial benefits along with the tensions and 
obstacles to interdisciplinarity of which we are often more aware. Intellectual and institutional  
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distinctions between different approaches and areas of knowledge allow for more than one 
perspective on a problem to develop. The existence of multiple disciplines fosters what one might 
call “cognitive pluralism” or an awareness of the possibility of approaching a question from 
multiple points of view. Both this awareness and the availability of different approaches are 
generally considered assets in problem-solving.
4 The cultural standing of a discipline may wax and 
wane over time for a variety of reasons both internal and external. Disciplinary distinctions are 
valuable in protecting disciplines considered to be of lower status in a given context from 
encroachment and control by disciplines of higher status. They help to preserve cognitive pluralism 
even through periods of strong cultural bias toward one particular topic or approach. 
  Most of the distinctions we make today between the sciences and humanities developed 
some time between the 17th and the early 19th century. These include the notion that a scientific 
method is different from a literary or hermeneutic one, that the sciences study an objective law-
bound world in a progressive way while the humanities seek subjective self-understanding, and that 
one person cannot function professionally as both a scientist and a humanist at the same time. 
Before the 17th century the principal method of studying nature was through the careful analysis of 
ancient texts (by Aristotle, Dioscorides or Euclid, for example) and the principal justification of 
intellectual inquiry of any kind was that it enhanced the understanding and admiration of God. 
Many scholars moved back and forth in their writing and teaching between human history and 
natural history.
5 Similarly they moved freely among the four branches of philosophy taught at 
university--logic, physics, ethics and metaphysics--which spanned what we now call the "two 
cultures."  
  The most significant division among the disciplines in the pre-modern periods was instead 
that between "divine" and "secular" learning, to use the Latin terms of Cassiodorus in the 6th 
century, or between "divinity" and "humanity" in the terms of one English writer in 1483 (in a 
passage noted as the earliest use of "humanity" to designate a field of learning).
6 This distinction,  
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first institutionalized in medieval universities, made possible the separate development of 
philosophy and theology but also occasioned clashes over authority that resulted from that 
separation. In examining some of the early interactions between philosophy and theology I will 
argue in a first section that disciplinary distinctions have offered salutary protection for less 
prestigious fields to develop relatively freely from dominant ones. But disciplinary distinctions have 
also hampered the movement of ideas and methods between different disciplines, as I will show in a 
second section from the example of interactions between mathematical astronomy and natural 
philosophy in the 16
th and 17
th centuries. 
  Medieval and early modern disciplinary distinctions are rooted in the earliest texts of Greek 
philosophy. Plato classified the sciences according to their level of abstraction, with special 
attention to the mathematical disciplines. Aristotle wrote separate treatises in a wide range of areas 
and was associated with the principle that each field should proceed according to its own method as 
appropriate to its subject matter and level of abstraction.
7 Their writings spawned a tradition of 
discussion of the classification of sciences, even if neither author devoted as much attention to the 
question as later commentators made it seem. Aristotle became known especially for a bipartite 
division of philosophy into theoretical or speculative disciplines (metaphysics, physics and 
mathematics) and practical ones (ethics, politics and economics). A tripartite division with an 
additional third branch for “poesis” or productive knowledge can also be found in Aristotle, but was 
generally associated with Plato.
 8  Medieval and early modern commentators added multiple 
variations to the lists of disciplines and their placement in categories, but all the classifications 
shared the assumption that the disciplines formed a hierarchy.
 9 The theoretical disciplines generally 
ranked above the practical, for example; in ancient culture practical and mechanical activities were 
generally considered degrading and were associated with un-free or slave labor. Greater levels of 
abstraction also often conferred superiority--to metaphysics over physics for example. But not 
always: mathematics was recognized as more abstract, but Aristotelian classifications often ranked  
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it below and as a propedeutic to physics because of its presumed inability to account for real 
phenomena.
10  
  Medieval and Renaissance discussions of the classifications of knowledge in treatises or 
prefatory remarks made contributions to philosophy but generally had little impact on teaching or 
institutional structures. Much more consequential were the distinctions institutionalized in the 
universities which spread to the major centers of learning throughout Europe starting ca. 1200.
11  
The faculty of arts offered instruction in various parts of philosophy as preparation to the higher 
faculties of medicine, law and theology. Particularly as writings of Aristotle became widely 
available for the first time through translations from Greek and from Arabic, teaching in the faculty 
of arts focused on the explication of Aristotelian philosophy, from logic (already known through 
Latin summaries like Boethius') to the newly available texts in ethics, physics and metaphysics. 
Masters of arts trained students in these areas, who could after five years of study receive a master’s 
degree licensing them to teach in the arts faculty in turn. The faculty of arts was primarily designed 
as a way station where a master could teach before or while pursuing study in one of the higher 
faculties. But once it was institutionalized, the faculty of arts also enabled masters to spend their 
entire careers there, devoted to teaching and commenting on Aristotelian philosophy.  
  The separate incorporation of each faculty ensured that masters of arts set their own 
curricula and regulations independently of other faculties. At Paris and elsewhere masters of arts 
opted for a curriculum based on the Aristotelian texts which had recently become available in Latin 
translation during the 12
th and 13
th centuries.
12 They quickly came upon passages in Aristotle which 
posed difficulty for Christians, notably arguments for the eternity of the world, the mortality of the 
soul or the necessity of natural law, and they offered various interpretations designed to emphasize 
the compatibility of Aristotle with Christian doctrines. But some of these interpretations and the 
teaching of Aristotelian philosophy in general provoked negative reactions from theologians 
(notably at Oxford and Paris) and a spate of condemnations of various propositions, including most  
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famously the 219 propositions condemned in 1277 by the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier. 
Although the condemnations of 1277 were likely compiled in haste and do not name any specific 
teachers of the condemned views, they generally forbad teaching propositions which seemed to 
challenge the Christian notions of divine omnipotence, creation ex nihilo and the immortality of the 
soul. Most interestingly Tempier attacked those who “say that things are true according to 
philosophy but not according to the Catholic faith; as if there could be two contrary truths.”
13 Citing 
the Bible, Tempier insisted that there could only be one truth, to be found in the divine word as 
interpreted by the Church and its institutions, notably the faculty of theology. This condemnation 
warranted the claim by later historians (starting with Ernest Renan) that some philosophers in 13
th-
century Paris (perhaps Siger of Brabant or Boethius of Dacia) espoused a doctrine of “double truth” 
which allowed for philosophical truths to differ from theological ones. Recent scholarship has 
concluded that no philosopher explicitly taught such a position in 13th-century Paris, but 
acknowledges that some masters of arts defended their independence from theology in the 13
th 
century and a few later philosophers, like Pietro Pomponazzi in the early 16
th century, came close to 
articulating a form of double truth.
14 
  The condemnations of 1277 did not dislodge Aristotelian philosophy from its central place 
in the university curriculum. But the masters of arts at Paris henceforth steered clear of positions 
that might be interpreted as leading to a double truth and adopted other strategies for reconciling 
philosophy and theology. Many followed Thomas Aquinas in arguing that Aristotelian philosophy 
properly understood offered truths, but only partial truths (“preambles of the faith”) which had to be 
complemented by "articles of faith." The latter lay beyond the grasp of philosophy and were 
supplied by revelation and religious authority.
15 This strategy followed that of Moses Maimonides 
who, in his Guide to the Perplexed, argued for example that Aristotle supported the eternity of the 
world not as a demonstrated truth, but only to refute less plausible alternative positions. According 
to both Maimonides and Aquinas, Aristotle acknowledged that reason could not decide for or  
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against the eternity of the world; hence the need for revelation to establish creation as an article of 
faith.
16 With this and other ingenious maneuvers Aristotle’s philosophy was Christianized so it was 
not perceived as a threat to Christian doctrine; theologians and philosophers alike invoked Aristotle 
as a most respected source. 
  Religious authority certainly played a role in shaping philosophy teaching, especially at 
Paris (through explicit censorship and by fostering self-censorship), but the intellectual and 
institutional distinction between philosophy and theology in the medieval universities created a 
context in which philosophy developed with significant independence from theology, despite (or 
perhaps thanks to) its lesser status. Intellectual independence was the unintentional result of a 
separate incorporation of the faculties which relieved theologians from the burdens of teaching 
introductory courses and rarely occasioned anxiety among them. After all, theologians were all 
trained in Aristotelian philosophy; and though they had no training in theology, masters of arts were 
all clerics and acknowledged the supreme dignity of theology. As a result philosophers were free to 
develop areas of unique expertise—including cosmology, astronomy, optics, the sciences of weights 
and of motion, and “the intension and remission of forms,” which recorded and explained variations 
in the intensity of qualities of all kinds—from heat to charity.
17 The distinctions between philosophy 
and theology triggered an early episode of "conflict" at Paris in the condemnations of philosophical 
positions by religious authorities in the 13th century, but those same distinctions had made it 
possible in the first place for philosophers to formulate propositions which theologians could find 
condemnable. From their beginnings ca 1200 European universities fostered intellectually and 
institutionally distinct contexts for the development of philosophy and theology, as well as law and 
medicine, which served as a source of cognitive pluralism even within a unified religious context.
18  
  Opportunities for cognitive pluralism increased substantially during the early modern 
period, as both elements of the medieval synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity came under attack. 
Universities lost their position as the sole or even the principal site for intellectual activity, given the  
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employment of intellectuals and the formation of academies under princely or royal patronage. 
Aristotle was attacked on many different grounds by philosophers within and especially outside the 
universities and new alternatives were proposed, from Christianized versions of Platonism, 
Epicureanism, Stoicism and other ancient philosophies to the new philosophies of Descartes, 
Newton and Locke among others.
19  At the same time the unity of the medieval church was broken 
by Protestantism in its multiple forms, principally Anglicanism, Lutheranism and Calvinism, each 
of which in turn harbored a range of positions. Religious condemnations were henceforth limited in 
their geographical scope. The Catholic condemnations of heliocentrism in 1616, of Galileo in 1633 
or of Descartes' mechanical philosophy in 1671 had no impact on Protestant areas and were not 
honored equally in all Catholic countries either, since the French emphasized in the 16
th and 17
th 
centuries their Gallican privileges. Protestant churches issued condemnations too, but these were 
even more geographically limited since each church was dependent on a local temporal authority. In 
the 17
th century the number of possible combinations of different philosophical and religious 
positions and the multiple institutional contexts for intellectual work prevented any single synthesis 
from prevailing. By the 18
th century the dynamic between philosophy and theology was no longer 
the dominant intellectual issue. Some philosophes pared religion down to a deistic minimum so that 
it had virtually no place in their philosophy; other thinkers engaged in theological reflection and 
writing independently of religious authorities, often to unorthodox results.
20 Debates among 
theologians were increasingly limited to small, specialized circles or even forbidden by papal decree 
for fear of damage to the Church. Instead many new fields in the sciences and the humanities were 
successful in commanding a broad readership and increasingly theoretical discussion, including the 
belles-lettres (a category formed in the 18
th century), aesthetics, ethics and a number of scientific 
fields which acquired in the early 19
th century names and definitions that are still recognizable today 
(e.g. biology, geology, paleontology, chemistry, physics, etc).
21 With the development of separate 
educational tracks for scientific and literary fields during the 19
th century the preconditions were in  
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place for the formation of a new faultline between Snow’s two cultures, in place of the earlier 
constellation of theology vs philosophy.  
  As adherence to religious doctrine has become a matter of personal choice rather than an 
obligation in the modern period, the protection that disciplinary specialization afforded to 
philosophy in the 13
th century now helps to protect theology as an academic discipline. Disciplinary 
autonomy has in the past formed a crucial protective device for disciplines of lower status; 
philosophy would not have developed as independently as it did without such protection in pre-
modern Europe. Today too the less powerful disciplines (e.g. theology or the humanities) benefit 
from the autonomy that comes with respect for disciplinary distinctions. The gap between the "two 
cultures," for all its negative side-effects, is also worth respecting lest we try to reduce all truths to 
one as the condemnations of 1277 called for. Renewed calls for a single truth stem these days for 
example from religious groups who offer the Bible as the answer to all questions, but also from 
some scientists who promise an explanation of all human phenomena through the mechanisms in 
which their field specializes. In announcing the “coming together” of the sciences and the 
humanities E.O. Wilson’s Consilience proposed a reduction of the various disciplines  to the 
perspective of biology.
22 The ideal of the unification of knowledge may still seem appealing today 
and certainly has a long  history. But given the complexity of human experience as we perceive it 
now, after centuries of disciplinary pluralism in the Western intellectual tradition, no single 
explanatory scheme will likely win the assent of a broad cross-section of academics or the general 
public. To strive for a single truth involves eliminating more or less self-consciously alternative 
perspectives, including the very notion that complexity is a central feature of persuasive knowledge 
claims.  Although the fissiparous tendencies of modern cultures can be lamented and may invite 
various remedies, we need some disciplinary distinctions. They aided the beginnings of rational 
philosophy in the medieval universities, when theology was the dominant discipline. Today they 
allow for the cultivation of disciplines (e.g. in the humanities and social sciences) which have  
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qualities to complement trends dominant in the natural sciences, by emphasizing (among other 
themes) the co-existence of a multiplicity of perspectives, complexity of explanation, and the 
instability of current, and past, cultural trends. 
 
  At the same time as we need disciplinary distinctions, we also benefit from encouraging 
exchange across disciplines between and within these institutional-cultural boundaries. Pre- and 
early modern disciplinary interactions support the conclusion that disciplinary distinctions, while 
salutary in some respects, have also slowed the growth of new approaches, notably 
"interdisciplinary" ones. The status of mathematical disciplines within natural philosophy in the pre-
modern periods offers a good case in point. The mathematical disciplines formed a distinct group 
already in antiquity,
23 comprising principally arithmetic, geometry, harmonics (music), astronomy 
and optics, and required a distinctive expertise in mathematics. Although mathematics was 
acknowledged to produce a high level of certainty, Aristotle and most Aristotelians considered 
mathematics inferior to physics because it did not adequately account for the complexity of physical 
reality; instead Aristotelian physics offered a qualitative analysis of such topics as time, motion and 
causation. Most scholastics shared this conception of physics, but some medieval philosophers 
cultivated disciplines which were considered mixed or intermediate between physics and 
mathematics because partaking of both—notably astronomy, optics and harmonics. The 
transmission to European universities of Arabic treatises alongside ancient texts in the 13
th century 
renewed interest in these fields; in addition new “mixed sciences” emerged in the 14
th century, such 
as the science of weights and the measurement of bodies (stereometry) and mathematical 
approaches to the study of motion. The Merton school in 14
th-century Oxford is especially noted for 
its development of these scientiae mediae, but its impact remained fairly limited in time and place.
24 
  
  Of more decisive consequence was the confrontation between mathematical methods and  
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those of Aristotelian physics which unfolded in astronomy and physics between the 15th and the 
17th centuries. Two separate disciplines had developed since antiquity: mathematical astronomers 
like Ptolemy developed models carefully matched to observations and which made accurate 
predictions, while natural philosophers ignored these models as irrelevant to the physics of planetary 
motion which they derived instead from commentary on Aristotelian texts. Recent research has 
emphasized that the mathematical astronomers viewed their work as relevant to a physical 
understanding of the heavens in the 14th and 15th centuries, long before natural philosophers, from 
their position of greater intellectual and institutional prestige, were willing to do so (mostly in the 
17th).
25 Copernicus had addressed his presentation of the heliocentric model in De revolutionibus 
(1543) quite pointedly to "those trained in mathematics" like himself and at the same time offered 
heliocentrism as a realist description of planetary movements. Copernicus thus meant to use 
mathematical astronomy as a basis for physical astronomy, but Andreas Osiander who saw the book 
through the press added an anonymous preface without the permission of Copernicus. This preface 
was designed to smooth the reception of the work by portraying heliocentrism as a convenient 
fiction with no claim to physical reality. Osiander’s fictionalism was interpreted at the time and for a 
long time afterward as Copernicus' own position. Indeed all but a handful of natural philosophers in 
the 16
th century ignored heliocentrism as a potential description of reality.
26 
  The status gained by the mixed mathematical sciences in the 14
th century was mostly 
ignored by natural philosophers in the 15
th and 16
th century as they pursued the humanist program 
of rejecting medieval innovations and focusing on Aristotle’s texts alone. Thus during the 
Renaissance natural philosophy as taught at universities rarely included any mathematical 
approaches, The creation of new educational institutions in the late 16th century, such as the Jesuit 
Collegio Romano, allowed for a renewed study and teaching of the mixed mathematical disciplines 
which could then spread elsewhere. Galileo's training at the University of Pisa for example included 
elements derived from teaching at the Collegio Romano.
27 Galileo was one of a handful of near- 
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contemporaries who took Copernicus’ work seriously as physical, not just mathematical astronomy. 
He saw the importance of  developing a physics that could accompany heliocentrism (for example 
by explaining inertial and projectile motion). Galileo angered his fellow natural philosophers by 
mocking them and their Aristotelianism; he wrote most of his works after he had ceased teaching at 
university and was receiving patronage from the Medici. The efforts of Galileo and others 
culminated in Newton's Principia, which articulated mathematical laws of motions that accounted 
for everyday phenomena as well as the motions of the planets according to a heliocentric model. As 
a result, "natural philosophy" (as Newton still called his field) was visibly changed from a 
hermeneutic activity – which had been characteristic of philosophy of all kinds until then – to an 
activity which required mathematical expertise and was thus differentiated from the other branches 
of philosophy. But the formation of this new mathematical physics and its subsequent diffusion 
through print, academic societies and university teaching had taken over a century because it 
required breaking down traditional and long institutionalized disciplinary boundaries and 
hierarchies.
28  
  Copernicus’ presentation of his work as written by a mathematician for mathematicians not 
only claimed for mathematics an expanded purview into statements about physical reality, but also 
claimed independence for his work and his field from the criticism and meddling of  “babblers,” 
who might invoke biblical passages to attack heliocentrism without understanding the mathematical 
and astronomical arguments which supported it.
29 This attempt to forestall religious criticism was 
successful to the extent that little attention was paid to heliocentrism as a realist model before 1600. 
But arguments against heliocentrism on biblical grounds were frequently raised and considered 
significant by both Protestants and Catholics. They led the Lutheran Tycho Brahe to develop a geo-
heliocentric system which combined some of the mathematical elegance of heliocentrism with a 
stationary earth. On the Catholic side a new insistence on abiding by traditional interpretations of 
the Bible (as defined principally by the Church Fathers) resulted in the condemnation of  
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heliocentrism as absurd in philosophy and heretical in religion in 1616 and the condemnation of 
Galileo in 1633 for taking such a public stance in support of heliocentrism in his Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. This condemnation was ineffective in stemming the 
acceptance of Cartesian and Newtonian cosmologies, both of them heliocentric, and a movement 
within the Church to overturn it began in the mid-18
th century, though Copernicus’ book was 
removed from the Index only in 1833.
30 After the condemnation of Descartes in 1671, which did 
not prevent the adoption of Cartesianism in French universities by the 1690s, the Catholic Church 
generally avoided taking stands on new scientific ideas. The faultline between theology and 
philosophy which had dominated disciplinary interactions since the Middle Ages faded as other 
disciplinary constellations took shape. 
  During the 17
th century the gap between mathematical sciences and natural philosophy 
gradually closed and a gap between the "two cultures" began to emerge. The conversion of natural 
philosophers from commentary on Aristotle to the study of mathematical laws of nature was an 
early and significant phase of this process. The mathematized Newtonian synthesis was rapidly 
hailed in its time as conclusively demonstrated, universally true and clearly superior to any 
alternatives (even in France where Newtonianism prevailed by the 1730s). Natural history and the 
life sciences did not change as radically during the 17
th century, but these disciplines too became 
less reliant on ancient authority and increasingly grounded in direct observation. Even without a 
mathematical barrier to entry, these fields developed specialist requirements of their own--including 
for example protocols for the use of instruments, for description and comparative analysis of 
specimens.
31 Most importantly Francis Bacon created an aura of authority for the non-mathematical, 
empirical sciences on the promise that they would soon deliver practical improvements and new 
knowledge.
32 
  The new admiration for the natural sciences, both mathematical and “Baconian,” was an 
important backdrop for the debates known as the “quarrel of the ancients and the moderns” in  
 
 
13 
 
France and the Battle of the Books in England.
33 Charles Perrault, secretary to Louis XIV’s minister 
Colbert, is credited with starting the French dispute with his delivery in 1687 at the Académie 
Française of a long poem in which he sang the praises of the age of Louis XIV. He did so 
principally by proclaiming the superiority of modern accomplishments over those of the ancients in 
fields ranging from architecture, sculpture and literature to navigation and commerce. Perrault 
himself remarked that modern superiority was "incontestable" in "fields whose secrets can be 
calculated and measured," notably "astronomy, geography, navigation, physics, chemistry and 
mechanics [méchaniques]."
34 In eloquence and poetry Perrault was no less adamant about modern 
superiority, but he noted that "the impossibility of convincing people in things of taste and 
imagination" prevented many from acknowledging that superiority. Indeed Perrault’s enemies did 
not dispute claims for progress in the natural sciences, but the debates in France and in England 
focused on arguments about the relative merits of modern and ancient accomplishments in the arts 
and literature. These debates likely helped to define artistic and humanistic fields as distinct from 
the sciences precisely because their achievements could not be measured by practical innovations or 
 widely shared notions of progress. Perrault himself effectively assumed a distinction between the 
“two cultures,” observing, as if the point were unproblematic and self-evident, that scientific fields 
were cumulative and progressive, while in literary fields matters of taste prevailed over any more 
objective standard of measurement.  
  The disciplinary constellation we live with, with a major faultline between the sciences and 
the humanities (and the social sciences forming in the later 19
th century), has roots in the 17
th 
century, in the changes in scientific methods and practices, and in the decline of the tension between 
philosophy and theology characteristic of earlier disciplinary interactions. The gap between the “two 
cultures” is bridged today in a number of different ways: by educational requirements in high school 
and college (which have not necessarily declined despite the end of requirements in classical 
languages), by writings in both areas aimed at non-specialist audiences and by the curiosity of  
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individuals in sampling the huge range of kinds of knowledge, available in an ever-increasing range 
of media. The gap between the two or three (or more) cultures does not strike me as inherently 
detrimental to our culture—I see it rather as a sign of vitality.  
  The distinctions we make between disciplines are subject to change over time even though 
in any given context institutional structures and intellectual arguments are often used to portray 
those distinctions as fundamental or inherent in the nature of things. Although they are malleable, 
disciplinary distinctions are not arbitrary--they develop from the assumptions, practices and 
understandings which are part of the fabric of intellectual and social life of that time and place. 
Disciplinary distinctions are often decried for narrowing and restricting intellectual work that 
crosses or merges the disciplines. Certainly interdisciplinary work has often been of great value, for 
example in the development of the “mixed mathematical” fields which are at the origins of  many of 
the modern physical sciences. Interdisciplinarity is now so well recognized as to be institutionalized 
in many instances. At the same time disciplinary distinctions and the institutional structures that 
support them have also been useful, notably in enabling less prestigious disciplines to develop with 
minimal from dominant ones. As the distinctions between the two cultures seem to be growing 
sharper than ever, I hope we can look forward to continued acknowledgement of the differences that 
warrant their intellectual and institutional separation, even as we promote opportunities for 
interacting between and beyond those distinctions.  
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I am grateful to Oren Harman and Michael Shank for many helpful suggestions. 
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